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I know very little about the Cambodian situation which is not common knowledge today. As a professedly neutralist state, under its ruler, Norodom Sihanouk, it has been having its problems in the last few years, problems which Norodom was the first to admit. Its neutrality has been violated, both by occasional incursions by U.S. aircraft, and by the increasing use which has been made of its regions which border Vietnam by troops of the NLF and North Vietnam. Faced with this problem, Sihanouk has sought to keep his balance on an extremely narrow tightrope, between Hanoi and Peking on the one hand, and Washington and Saigon on the other. So, for instance, in 1965, he both broke relations with the U.S., and publicly stated his belief that after the U.S. disappeared from the region, his regime would inevitably collapse; he has warned Peking that China's actions against his country would drive him into American arms, and has warned Washington that our actions would drive him into Peking's embrace. In 1969 he resumed diplomatic relations with Washington, and warned Hanoi that, faced ~~xxxx~~ with a choice between the Communists and the Americans, the Cambodians would choose the latter; at the same time he maintained his diplomatic relations with the NLF, and assured China that he would continue to oppose the Americans.

Sihanouk, therefore, did not seem to oppose our presence in southeast Asia as such; he did warn very vehemently that our actions would involve China, and thus endanger his regime. He has not been able to prevent the use of his territory by the warring forces; the NLF and the North Vietnamese have used the border territories for some years, and after the recent coup which ousted Sihanouk,

they have apparently moved into the heartland of the country as well. Thus, whatever else can be said about the rights and wrongs of the Cambodian escapade, we were hardly the only ones, and probably not the first, to violate its territorial integrity; this was violated a long time ago, in force, by the North Vietnamese, who - as Sihanouk pointed out in 1969 - were infiltrating the country in force.

The point, however, tonight is not who was first to invade Cambodia; the point, I think, is whether the operation undertaken by our troops last week will shorten the war, as the President says, or whether in fact it will lengthen it, at the same time costing many, many more lives -- American, Vietnamese, and Cambodian. And the example of recent history, for what it is worth, seems to suggest that the latter will be the case. Once in Cambodia, we are afraid, we have only succeeded in digging another hole for ourselves, and I take it that the first priority for all of us is to bring the war to an end as soon as possible.

To believe this is not to say, as some feel to be necessary, that all will be well in southeast Asia once we evacuate the peninsula. There is no need to romanticize the situation in North Vietnam; the record of the regime there has shown it to be a government ~~only~~ neither particularly humane nor particularly efficient. What its foreign policy would be is hard to say; Sihanouk himself, before his fall, warned darkly of the possibility that Hanoi and Peking would attempt to partition the whole Indochinese peninsula between them.

I do not think it necessary for us, in opposing the war, to avoid the darker features of the regime in the north. While I am

not a pacifist, I do believe that a war, to be justified, must -- among other things -- take place only when the ravage and destruction which it causes would be less than that which would take place were there no war; in the final balance sheet war, while always an evil, must be the lesser of two evils. And this is where, it seems to me, our policy in Indochina has signally failed. I have no great hopes for the future of the peninsula after an American evacuation; yet our continued presence there seems to be far, far worse than what we are trying to prevent. There is no easy, pleasant answer to this; we must take the best of a rather bad lot of solutions, and today, it would seem, withdrawal is the least bad.

What will the continuation of the war mean for this country? Vice-President Agnew, last night, warned people like you against people like me; he appears to have accused teachers of leading their students into the paths of cynicism. I would imagine that actually much of the cynicism of the students comes from the fact that our invasion of Cambodia -- which was not cleared with Phnompenh, which was not cleared with the U.S. Congress -- took place on the eve of "Law Day, U.S.A." President Nixon that night warned against the United States acting like a "pitiful and helpless giant". I would contend that by our becoming embroiled in ~~xxxxxx~~ Indochina, this is precisely what we have become; a country which can no longer be trusted, whose policy has become capricious, and thus has become too often an object of fear and loathing rather than hope, to the rest of the world.

It can mean more than this for our policies at home. Years ago, an English statesman, writing of his own country's suppression of rebellion in India, wrote of the classic dilemma of all imperial countries: how can a nation, founded on free and representative

Institutions at home, govern despotically another country abroad? Either its colonial government is weak and inefficient, or -- more likely -- its own free institutions at home will become corrupted by the use of despotic power abroad. This is Richard Cobden, in 1858:

"I am afraid our national character is being deteriorated, and our love of freedom in danger of being impaired by what is passing in India. Is it possible that we can play the part of despot and butcher there without finding our character deteriorated at home? were not the ancient Greeks and Romans corrupted and demoralized by their Asiatic conquests, and may we not share their fate, though in a different way?" This, it seems to me, is the situation we have been increasingly facing for some years, thanks to our mounting involvement in Vietnam.

Let me close with two words of warning. First, in an age where irrationality and violence is mounting, and is used by those in authority, as well as those challenging authority, do not fall into the trap which is being dug for you. In an age in which both Mr. Agnew and his opposite numbers on the Left are seeking to polarize politics, do not fall into the trap of allowing yourselves to be polarized. Mindlessness and violence, both physical and rhetorical, on the Right, must not be met with mindlessness and violence on the Left, however tempting emotionally such a response might be. If this country becomes truly polarized, we all know on which pole the great majority will find themselves, and it is our responsibility, in the face of what we take to be the increasing irresponsibility of our leaders, to prevent this from happening.

Secondly, let me echo the appeal for unity which has already been made here. Perhaps the time has come to stop playing political games in the colleges and universities like this across the country, to stop pretending that here we have society in microcosm, with faculty and administration playing the role of the Establishment, the military-industrial complex, and students the role of a dispossessed proletariat. The country is going to go through extraordinarily difficult and dangerous times in the future, and it seems to me -- I am a prejudiced observer -- that its colleges and universities have a role of major responsibility to play in helping to see it through those times. As President Armstrong reminded us this afternoon, a college is, and by its very nature has to be, an extraordinarily fragile and vulnerable institution, and the internal divisions, which in more secure times it can deal with, in these times may wound it very badly, if not destroy it. Let us forget these differences then, which are so often artificial, and in an age in which divisiveness is fostered by so many in positions of authority, let us unite for our common good. Then perhaps one day we can meet again in this Chapel, not for another memorial service, not for a thanksgiving for victory, for we all know that in modern war there is no victory, but rather for a thanksgiving that the war is at last over.

Stroessner, therefore, did not seem to oppose our presence so vehemently as I thought; he did warn very vehemently that our actions would involve chaos, and thus endanger his regime. He has no desire to prevent the use of his territory by the warring forces; the CIA and the South Vietnamese have used the border territories for many years, not since the recent coup which ousted Stroessner.